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THE SUPREME COURT, CONGRESS, AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW
JEFFREY A. SEGAL* & CHAD WESTERLAND**
Recent separation-of-powers models presume that the Supreme
Court must account for congressional preferences when deciding
whether to declare federal legislation unconstitutional. Given
Congress's ability to restrict or to overturn judicial decisions-even
in constitutional cases-plus Congress's authority to strike at the
Court, scholars argue that the Court will be free to overturn laws
only when the Court and Congress are ideologically aligned.
Therefore, increasing ideological distance between the Court
median and Congress may make the Court less likely to overturn
legislation. We test this hypothesis by placing the median member
of the Court and each chamber of Congress on a common scale and
then examining the number of federal laws declared
unconstitutional in each year between 1949 and 2001. We find no
evidence to support the hypothesis that the ideological distance
between the median member of the Court and Congress constrains
the Court's constitutional decisions. Rather, our analysis suggests
that the Court is more likely to declare laws unconstitutional only as
the Court becomes more conservative, which has important
implications for how we understand the Court's place in American
government.
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INTRODUCTION
In the study of majority rule institutions, the Median Voter
Theorem is simply unavoidable.' If preferences array along a single
dimension, such as liberalism-conservatism, the median voter will be
on the winning side of any majority vote.2 This disarmingly simple
mathematical truism is central to the study of politics. The Median
Voter Theorem provides the starting point for understanding
everything from the prediction of how political candidates select issue
positions in an election to the explanation of where legislative output
will be located in policy space. Absent institutional rules that alter
the majority rule process, knowledge of the location of the median
member of the voting population tells us precisely what the outcome
of the vote will be.3
The Median Voter Theorem has an obvious application to the
United States Supreme Court. The vote on the merits in any given
case is as straightforward as a majority rule process gets. Justices
essentially make a binary, reverse or affirm decision. Assuming that
1. See DUNCAN BLACK, THE THEORY OF COMMITrEES AND ELECTIONS 16 (1958)
(proving the theorem); ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY
115-17 (1957) (specifying how the Theorem applies in a democratic, majority-rule setting).
For Downs, candidates seeking election should choose policies that are preferred by the
median of the electorate because that is the only way to capture enough votes to ensure
electoral victory. DOWNS, supra, at 116-17.
2. If there are multiple dimensions to a single vote or election, then the Median
Voter Theorem does not apply. See PETER C. ORDESHOOK, GAME THEORY AND
POLITICAL THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 164-66 (1986).
3. The literature on the applied mechanics of the Median Voter Theorem is
immense. See, e.g., Stephen Ansolabehere, James M. Snyder, Jr. & Charles Stewart, III,
Candidate Positioning in U.S. House Elections, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 136, 141-52 (2001)
(providing a recent examination of how House candidates select issue positions).
Ansolabehere et al. find that candidates gravitate toward the median member of their
districts with some moderating influence from national party interests. Id. at 152-53. This
work, like much of the similar work in the field, uses various proxies for legislator
position-taking and voter preferences, such as legislator ideology scores and voter survey
responses. See generally Keith Krehbiel, Spatial Models of Legislative Choice, 13 LEGIS.
STUD. Q. 259 (1988) (providing a very thorough overview of the various predictions made
by spatial models of legislative behavior that are derived from the Median Voter
Theorem).
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we can measure the Justices' sincere preferences,4 and that the
Justices can be placed along a single ideological dimension (usually
liberal-conservative) in a particular case,5 the median Justice's
preference will determine the outcome. If the median member wishes
to affirm, by definition, at least four other Justices will agree, thus
achieving a majority outcome on the merits. Put in slightly more
colloquial terms, the median member of the Court is the swing vote.
As goes the median, so goes the Court.6
The application of the Median Voter Theorem to the Court
becomes more complicated, however, if the Court strategically
considers the preferences of other actors, such as Congress or the
President. Assuming the Court is mindful of policy outcomes,7 it
presumably wishes to avoid decisions that are likely to be attacked by
other political actors, as such responses could potentially make the
Court worse off than if the Court had rationally anticipated the likely
responses. If other political actors actually respond in ways that
damage the Court and its decisions, then the Court will avoid making
decisions that prompt such attacks because these responses
undermine the Court's ability to make policy.9 In terms of the
4. See Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S.
Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SC1. REV. 557, 559-63 (1989) (measuring Justices'
preferences from newspaper editorials prior to the Justices' confirmations); see also
Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain
Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134, 140-52
(2002) (using Bayesian statistical techniques to measure the Justices' preferences). But see
G. Edward White, Unpacking the Idea of the Judicial Center, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1168-71
(2005) (arguing that behavioralist methodologies overlook "vital elements in the calculus
of judges" because they do not analyze a judge's decisionmaking process in "sufficient
depth to produce an understanding of his or her jurisprudential sensibility").
5. For examples of statistical evidence demonstrating that a single liberal-
conservative dimension explains the Court's decisions see Martin & Quinn, supra note 4,
at 145 and Bernard Grofman & Timothy J. Brazill, Identifying the Median Justice on the
Supreme Court Through Multidimensional Scaling: Analysis of 'Natural Courts' 1953-
1991, 112 PUB. CHOICE 55, 58 (2002).
6. See, e.g., JAMES F. SIMON, THE CENTER HOLDS 287-94 (1995) (finding that the
O'Connor-Kennedy center on the Rehnquist Court forestalled a conservative revolution);
Grofman & Brazill, supra note 5, at 63 (identifying the median Justice as "the ideological
center of gravity of each of our natural courts").
7. See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 92 (2002) (arguing that the Justices are motivated
by policy goals).
8. See, e.g., Rafael Gely & Pablo T. Spiller, A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme
Court Statutory Decisions with Applications to the State Farm and Grove City Cases, 6 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 263, 295-96 (1990) (suggesting that the Court anticipates and avoids
congressional responses).
9. See, e.g., Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court
as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 283-85 (1957) (arguing that the Court cannot
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median member of the Court, the median may sincerely prefer to
affirm a decision but may believe such a decision will be legislatively
overturned. A legislative response that reverses the Court's decision
not only hurts the Court from a policy perspective (a less preferred
outcome is realized), but presumably damages the Court's legitimacy
and authority as well.10 Therefore, the assumption that other political
actors, namely Congress and the President, have the ability to
respond to the Court's decisions animates separation-of-powers
analysis. If political actors can respond in such a way to the Court's
decisions, knowledge about the median member of the Court is not
enough to understand the Court's decision on the merits; rather, one
must understand the median member in relation to other political
actors.
Of course, for the Court to behave strategically, other political
actors must actually be able to respond effectively to the Court's
decisions. Available responses, however, vary depending on the
nature of the decision made by the Court. At first glance, the Court's
statutory decisions (decisions in which the Court only interprets the
meaning of a statute) appear to be quite vulnerable to such legislative
responses, as Congress can overturn them via ordinary legislation."
Alternatively, its constitutional decisions (decisions in which the
Court rules on the constitutionality of a statute or other governmental
actions) seem to be more insulated from attack, given the difficulty of
constitutional amendment. 2 Recent separation-of-powers models,
however, argue that the Supreme Court must account for
congressional preferences when deciding whether to declare federal
legislation unconstitutional.13 Given Congress's purported ability to
effectively make policy if it makes decisions that a ruling coalition will oppose).
10. See Lee Epstein, Jack Knight, & Andrew D. Martin, The Supreme Court as a
Strategic National Policymaker, 50 EMORY L.J. 583, 597 (2001).
11. For example, by providing in the Civil Rights Restoration Act that Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972 apply to all programs receiving direct or indirect federal
assistance, Congress effectively overturned Grove City College v. Bell, which held that
Title IX's nondiscriminatory provisions only applied to the college's financial aid program.
See The Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, 102 Stat. 28 (1998); Grove City Coll. v. Bell,
465 U.S. 555, 572 (1984).
12. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 418 (1989) (holding that a state statute
making flag burning a crime violated the First Amendment); Abington Sch. Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963) (holding that a state statute requiring a Bible reading at
the beginning of the day at public schools violated the Establishment Clause); Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962) (holding that prayer in public schools violated the
Establishment Clause). None of the above constitutional cases have been effectively
overturned by congressional legislation.
13. See Epstein et al., supra note 10, at 591-94; Barry Friedman & Anna L. Harvey,
Electing the Supreme Court, 78 IND. L.J. 123, 125 (2003) [hereinafter Friedman & Harvey,
1326 [Vol. 83
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restrict or to overturn judicial decisions in constitutional cases and
Congress's ability to strike at the Court, scholars argue that the Court
will be free to overturn laws only when the Court and Congress are
ideologically aligned.14 Therefore, increasing ideological distance
between the Court median and Congress may make the Court less
likely to overturn legislation.
We test this hypothesis by placing the median member of the
Court, each chamber of Congress, and the executive on a common
scale and then examining the number of federal laws declared
unconstitutional in each year between 1949 and 2001. We find no
evidence to support the hypothesis that the ideological distance
between the median member of the Court and Congress constrains
the Court's constitutional decisions. Rather, our analysis suggests
that the Court is more likely to declare laws unconstitutional only as
the Court becomes more conservative, which has important
implications for how we understand both the Court's decisionmaking
process and the Court's willingness to strike down federal legislation.
This Article proceeds in the following manner. Section I
provides a brief explanation of precisely how the Court is a median
driven institution. In Section II we examine separation-of-powers
arguments for why the Court might need to consider congressional
and presidential preferences when making statutory and
constitutional decisions. We present our hypotheses, research design,
and results in Section III. Finally, we offer a brief conclusion
rejecting the notion that judicial activism is a liberal phenomenon.
I. THE MEDIAN VOTER THEOREM AND THE SUPREME COURT
The median member of the Court certainly plays a pivotal role in
the Court's decisionmaking process, but the Court is not wholly a
median driven institution. Specifically, neither the certiorari decision
nor the formulation of the Court's majority opinion may be
represented usefully as a function of the median member of the
Court. 5 At the outset, a demonstration of why the median member
Electing the Supreme Court]; Anna Harvey & Barry Friedman, The Limits of Judicial
Independence: The Supreme Court's Constitutional Rulings, 1987-2000, Paper Prepared
for the Annual Conference of the Midwest Political Science Association, Apr. 15-18, 2004
[hereinafter Harvey & Friedman, The Limits of Judicial Independence] (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
14. See, e.g., Harvey & Friedman, The Limits of Judicial Independence, supra note 13,
at 2-3 (asserting that "the Court is constrained by the policy preferences of federal elected
officials in its constitutional decisions").
15. See, e.g., Chad Westerland, Who Owns the Majority Opinion? Policy Making on
the U.S. Supreme Court, Paper presented at the 2003 Annual Meeting of the American
132720051
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of the Court does not control the bookends of the Court's
decisionmaking process provides a necessary reminder that not every
decision made by the Court meets the necessary assumptions for the
Median Voter Theorem.
The Court's procedure for deciding what cases it hears is
governed by the "rule of four."16 In order for a case to be added to
the docket, only agreement between four Justices is necessary. The
Court's agenda is created by a non-majoritarian institutional rule, and
if these case selection decisions are examined in isolation from the
rest of the Court's decisionmaking processes, the Median Voter
Theorem does not apply. Even with this non-majority rule, the
shadow of the median member of the Court is still likely cast over the
agenda decisions, as a forward thinking minority coalition of four
would certainly try to avoid docketing cases that they are sure to
lose. 7
The creation of the majority opinion also may not be controlled
by the median member of the Court. Westerland hypothesizes that
the majority opinion could reflect the preferences of the opinion
writer, the Court median, or the median of the majority decision
coalition, and Westerland's empirical tests suggest that the majority
median likely controls the majority opinion.18 Westerland argues that
this is to be expected in part because a majority coalition operates as
an independent bargaining unit when creating majority opinions.
Disagreement on the merits of a case precludes agreement on the
majority opinion, which means that bargaining over the content of the
majority opinion will only occur between Justices who agree on the
outcome. The logic of the Median Voter Theorem still applies, but
only to the subgroup of Justices who make up the majority coalition.
Absent any extra-institutional considerations, the merits decision
should be driven by the median member of the Court. This is
consistent not just with the Median Voter Theorem, but with the
attitudinal model.19 The major insight of the attitudinal model is that
the votes of the Justices are ideologically driven: "Simply put,
Political Science Association 26-30 (demonstrating the importance of the median of the
majority decision coalition, and not the median of the Court, in controlling the output of
the majority opinion) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
16. ROBERT L. STERN & EUGENE GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 374-77
(5th ed. 1978).
17. GLENDON A. SCHUBERT, QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR
210-54 (1959) (examining forward-thinking strategies among the Justices).
18. Westerland, supra note 15, at 7-19.
19. See generally SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 7 (explaining and applying the role of
ideological values to an extensive range of Supreme Court behavior).
1328 [Vol. 83
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Rehnquist votes the way he does because he is extremely
conservative; Marshall voted the way he did because he was
extremely liberal. '20  The development of exogenous preferences
measures facilitated empirical tests of the attitudinal model, and the
model performs remarkably well.21 If Justices have preferences over
policy outcomes and if they sincerely vote according to their
ideological preferences, then the Median Voter Theorem tells us that
the median member of the Court should be driving the Court's
output. We use the Martin-Quinn scores to calculate the ideology of
the median member of the Court and the United States Supreme
Court database to derive the Court's policy outputs.2  Figure 1, which
graphs the location of the Court median and the percentage of
conservative outcomes for each term, demonstrates this connection.
As the location of the median becomes more conservative, a greater
percentage of the Court's cases result in conservative outcomes.
Nevertheless, if extra-institutional considerations apply, the Court's
output will not be well-represented by the preferences of the median,
thus limiting the scope of the Theorem.
20. Id. at 86.
21. For wholly exogenous preference measures, see Segal & Cover, supra note 4, at
560. The newspaper editorials used by Segal and Cover are exogenous as they only use
editorials referencing Supreme Court nominees' ideology that appear prior to their
serving on the Court. Id. at 559-60. For the success of the attitudinal model as an
explanatory model of Supreme Court decisionmaking on the merits, see SEGAL &
SPAETH, supra note 7, at 312-26, who find, among other things, a correlation of 0.76
between the Justices' ideology and their votes in civil liberties cases.
22. We use the median as calculated with the dynamic Martin-Quinn scores. See
Martin & Quinn, supra note 4. Martin and Quinn use a Bayesian measurement model to
estimate the ideal points of Supreme Court Justices from 1953-1999. See id. at 137-45
(providing an explanation of the specification and estimation of their model).
The Supreme Court Database is a multi-user database that provides detailed data,
including ideological direction, on Supreme Court decisions since the start of the Warren
Court. To calculate the percentage of conservative decisions, we use the Supreme Court
Database's liberal-conservative outcome variable if the unit of analysis is the case citation
or a split vote case (ANALU = 0 or 4) and for all orally argued cases that result in an
opinion (DEC_TYPE = 1, 6, or 7). For an explanation on coding liberal-conservative
outcomes in Supreme Court decisions, see HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE ORIGINAL UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT JUDICIAL DATA BASE, 1953-2003 TERMS 55-58 (2004),
available at http://www.as.uky.edu/polisci/ulmerproject/ sctdata.htm (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
2005] 1329
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Court Median & Court Output
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Figure 1
II. THE SEPARATION-OF-POWERS MODEL
A. Statutory Model
The so-called separation-of-powers models examine the degree
to which courts must defer to legislative majorities in order to prevent
overrides that result in outcomes worse than what the Court might
have achieved through more sophisticated behavior.23 All such
models require placing the Court's policy output in ideological space,
using the median member's preferences to do so. In the landmark
work, Marks carefully examined the placement of preferences in
Congress that prevented Grove City College v. Belfl4 from being
overturned prior to 1986.25 Consistent with the attitudinal model,
Marks claimed that the Justices simply voted their ideal points.
Building on his work, subsequent "neo-Marksist" theorists argued
that if the Court exercised rational foresight, it would not always
choose its ideal point.26 Epstein, Knight, and Martin phrase the
23. See generally SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 7, at 326-49 (testing the separation-of-
powers model on the Supreme Court's statutory decisions); William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Reneging on History? Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L.
REV. 613 (1991) (applying the separation-of-powers model to civil rights cases); BRIAN A.
MARKS, A MODEL OF JUDICIAL INFLUENCE ON CONGRESSIONAL POLICYMAKING:
GROVE CITY COLLEGE V. BELL (The Hoover Institution, Working Papers in Political
Science, Working Paper No. P-88-7, 1988) (examining the interrelationship between
judicial decisions and congressional reaction in the Grove City case).
24. 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
25. MARKS, supra note 23, at 29 (noting that Senate Judiciary Committee Chair Orrin
Hatch (R, UT) kept override legislation bottled up in his committee).
26. See, e.g., John Ferejohn & Charles Shipan, Congressional Influence on
Bureaucracy, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 17-19 (1990) (examining the circumstances under
which courts must defer to congressional preferences); Gely & Spiller, supra note 8, at
284-95 (presenting case studies of the separation-of-powers model).
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motivating assumption behind separation-of-powers models as simply
as possible: "why would Justices who are policy-preference
maximizers take a position they know Congress would overturn?
'27
Separation-of-powers models are predicated on the ability of
Congress to respond to the Court's decisions. Because the Court has
consistently ruled that only a constitutional amendment can override
its constitutional decisions, 28 advocates of the separation-of-powers
models have typically limited the application of such models to
statutory cases before the Court. We present a standard
representation of these models as applied to the Court's statutory
decisions.
Consider the example in Figure 2, where the median Justice,
representing the Court, must decide a case in two-dimensional policy
space.29 The game is played as follows. First, the Court makes a
decision in (xl, x2) policy space. Second, the House and Senate can
override the Court decision if they agree on an alternative. H, S, and
C represent the ideal points of the House, Senate, and Court median,
respectively. The line segment HS represents the set of irreversible
decisions. That is, no decision on that line can be overturned by
Congress, because improving the position of one chamber by moving
closer to its ideal point necessarily worsens the position of the other.
Alternatively, any decision off of HC, call it x, can be overturned,
because there will necessarily be at least one point on HC that both H
and C prefer to x. Imagine, for example, a Court decision at the
Court's ideal point, C.10 The arc Is represents those points where the
Senate is indifferent to this decision. Obviously, the Senate prefers
any point inside the arc to any point on the arc (or, obviously, outside
the arc). Similarly, I. represents those points where the House is
indifferent to the Court's decision. Thus, both the House and Senate
prefer any point between S(C) (the point on the set of irreversible
decisions where the Senate is indifferent to the Court's decision) and
H(C) (the point on the set of irreversible decisions where the House
27. Epstein et al., supra note 10, at 591.
28. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000) (rejecting congressional
attempts to overturn Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)); City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (rejecting congressional attempts to impose a compelling interest
standard on free exercise cases).
29. For illustrative purposes, we explain the initial statutory model in two-dimensional
policy space. The substantive result of the model, that the Court chooses the spot closest
to its ideal point that cannot get overturned, is the same in the one-dimensional case. For
an example of the one-dimensional case, see Ferejohn & Shipan, supra note 26, at 9-12.
30. This specification of the model is simply for illustrative purposes, and thus ideal
points for all actors are purely hypothetical.
2005] 1331
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H=House ideal point; S=Senate ideal point; C=Court median;
1u=House indifference curve; Is=Senate indifference curve;
S(C)=Point on HS where Senate is indifferent to Court ideal point;
H(C)=Point on HS where House is indifferent to Court ideal point;
X*=equilibrium.
Figure 2
What, then, should a strategic Court do in this situation? If the
Court rules at its ideal point (or indeed any place off the set of
irreversible decisions), Congress will overturn the Court's decision
and replace it with something that is necessarily worse from the
Court's perspective. For example, if the Court rules at C, then
Congress will respond someplace between S(C) and H(C). The trick
for the Court is to find the point on the set of irreversible decisions
that is closest to its ideal point. By the Pythagorean Theorem, it
accomplishes this by dropping a perpendicular onto the line. Thus,
rather than voting sincerely at C and ending up with a policy
someplace between S(C) and H(C), the Court rules at X*, the point
between S(C) and H(C), indeed, the point between H and S, that it
prefers the most. This is the equilibrium result for statutory cases.
The separation-of-powers games differ in a variety of details,
such as the number of issue dimensions, the number of legislative
chambers, the influence of committees, the existence of presidential
veto, etcetera.31 But regardless of the specific assumptions made,
these models assume that the median member of the Court will
construe legislation as close to her ideal point as possible without
31. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 7, at 103-10, 326-51 (providing a detailed
discussion and review of this work).
1332 [Vol. 83
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getting overturned by Congress. As logical as this appears, there still
exist several theoretical problems with separation-of-powers models
as applied to statutory cases. Congress is generally assumed to have
the last word: the Court acts, Congress reviews, and the game ends,32
even though the Court can readily review congressional overrides.
33
The models assume further that the Court has complete and perfect
information about congressional preferences, which the Court uses to
predict how Congress will act.34 Finally, and most importantly, these
models underestimate the difficulty of actually passing override
legislation. 5
The seemingly most impressive quantitative support for the
separation-of-powers models comes from Spiller and Gely, who find
in their sophisticated econometric analysis that changes in the ideal
points of relevant congresspersons influence Court decisions in the
National Labor Relations Act cases to the same extent that changes
in the ideal points of the Supreme Court do.36 Unfortunately, their
models for the most part fail to distinguish sincere from sophisticated
behavior, and in the one model that does make the distinction, they
fail to include a necessary control for the Justices' preferences that
would have prevented severe statistical bias in their estimates.37
Additionally, the scaling mechanism used by Spiller and Gely is
worthy of more than a little scrutiny. Like all scholars in this field,
they need to find a manner of placing judicial preferences and
congressional preferences on a single scale. They accomplish this by
allowing the computer to find the imputed ADA scores for the Court
that best fit the empirical model, so that the median of a Court with x
number of Democrats will be equivalent to a congressperson with an
32. See Ferejohn & Shipan, supra note 26, at 9-12; John A. Ferejohn & Barry R.
Weingast, A Positive Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 263,
276-77 (1992); Pablo T. Spiller & Rafael Gely, Congressional Control or Judicial
Independence: The Determinants of U.S. Supreme Court Labor-Relations Decisions, 1949-
1988, 23 RAND J. ECON. 463, 465 (1992).
33. See Eskridge, supra note 23, at 636-38.
34. We should point out that congressional scholars are nowhere close to agreement
on this point. For classic examples illustrating the difficulty of determining congressional
preferences, see generally GARY W. COX & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, LEGISLATIVE
LEVIATHAN: PARTY GOVERNMENT IN THE HOUSE (1993) and Keith Kreihbel, Where's
the Party?, 23 BRITISH J. POL. Sl. 235 (1993).
35. For a full discussion, see Jeffrey A. Segal, Separation-of-Powers Games in the
Positive Theory of Congress and the Courts, 91 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 28, 32-33 (1997).
36. Spiller & Gely, supra note 32, at 489.
37. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 7, at 332-40 (discussing the effect of statistical bias
on the sincere behavior-sophisticated behavior distinction, in favor of falsely finding
strategic behavior).
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ADA score of y.38 What is notable about this technique, though, is
that it allows the imputed ADA score for a given Court to change
dramatically given different specifications of congressional behavior.
For example, in their Floor Median model,39 the median Supreme
Court Justice's imputed ADA score is equal to -46.13 + 1.9*SCDEM,
where SCDEM equals the percent of Democrats on the Court. Thus,
this model finds a significant impact for Congress by giving the Court
median during the later Vinson Court (Reed or Minton) an imputed
ADA score of 122.97, a fantastic result given that ADA scores
theoretically range from 0 (most conservative) to 100 (most liberal)
and that Ted Kennedy (D-MA), considered most liberal by many,
only averages a 95. 40 So too, the imputation finds the post-Douglas
Burger Court median (Stevens) to have an imputed ADA score of
16.57.41 Alternatively, in the Committee Median model,42 the model
overemphasizes Congress's impact by giving the Reed/Minton
Vinson-Court median an imputed ADA score of 109.71, and the
Stevens Burger-Court median an imputed ADA score of 30.75.43
Beyond the far from conclusive Spiller and Gely study, evidence
for the statutory separation-of-powers models has been difficult to
find. Segal's research findings have consistently found no support for
the statutory separation-of-powers model.' Marschall's and
38. ADA scores are one of many ideological report card scores given to Congressmen
by interest groups, in this case, the liberal Americans for Democratic Action. Scores are
based on the percentage of time members of Congress vote "correctly" in the specific roll
calls selected by ADA. See J. MICHAEL SHARP, THE DIRECTORY OF CONGRESSIONAL
VOTING SCORES AND INTEREST GROUP RATINGS XI-XII (1988); see also Spiller & Gely,
supra note 32, at 478 (describing the author's coding of the Justices by the Justices' own
party affiliations).
39. In the Floor Median Model, the median member of the legislative chamber is
assumed to drive legislative output.
40. See SHARP, supra note 38, passim (providing ADA scores). Note that Spiller and
Gely code Frankfurter as a Democrat for purposes of calculating the Court's percent
Democratic. See Spiller & Gely, supra note 32. The imputed ADA score for the Vinson
Court is derived using the Spiller & Gely floor median formula and substituting 88.9 for
the Supreme Court's percent democratic during the Vinson era. See id. at 470.
41. The imputed ADA for the Burger Court is derived using the Spiller & Gely floor
median formula and substituting 33.3 for the Supreme Court's percent democratic during
the Burger era. See Spiller & Gely, supra note 32, at 470.
42. In the Committee Median Model, the median member of the committee is
assumed to drive legislative output.
43. These data are derived by using the Spiller & Gely committee median formula
and multiplying the Supreme Court's percent democratic during the Vinson (88.9) and
Burger (33.3) eras and then subtracting 15.78. See Spiller & Gely, supra note 32, at 468.
44. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 7, at 344-49 (finding no influence of congressional
preferences on Supreme Court statutory decisions in civil liberties cases under a variety of
different specifications).
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Broscheid's work turns the Downsian space of the typical separation-
of-powers model into the binary "Schubertian" space that arguably
better represents judicial decisions.a They nevertheless find no
support for the separation-of-powers model.46  Martin uses a two-
level hierarchical probit model to test the influence of the separation-
of-powers model on the Justices' behavior.47 Despite ample evidence
that Court preferences strongly influence congressional decisions,
Martin finds no significant impact of either Congress or the President
on the Court's statutory decisions 8.4  Two studies examining narrower
sets of United States Supreme Court decisions find no support for
separation-of-powers hypotheses: McGuire finds that strategic
behavior does not account for the Supreme Court's support for the
Solicitor General,49  while Spriggs and Hansford find that
congressional preferences have no impact on the Court's decision to
overturn precedent. 0 Dealing explicitly with the problem of how to
compare ideology scores between Congress and the Court, Clinton's
work attempts to handle the scaling problem between Supreme Court
and congressional preferences by using the Presidency as a bridge
between them."l Under an extraordinary array of tests, he finds no
45. See Melissa Marschall & Andreas Broscheid, A NeoMarksist Model of Supreme
Court/Congress/President Interaction: The Civil Rights Cases, 1953-1992 6 (Dec. 6, 1995)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the North Carolina Law Review). Downsian space
treats policy decisions by the Court on a continuum, as in Figure 2. Schubertian space
treats policy decisions by the Court as binary, as in reverse/affirm.
46. Marschall & Broscheid, supra note 45, at 21-22.
47. Andrew D. Martin, Decision Making on the Supreme Court and the Separation of
Powers 9 (Sept. 16, 1998) [hereinafter Martin, Decision Making on the Supreme Court]
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the North Carolina Law Review). The two-level
hierarchical probit model employed by Martin accounts for the theoretical expectation
that the Justices' decisions will vary depending on the strategic context (meaning the
relative alignment of congressional and executive preferences). The model allows the
effects of the independent variables to vary depending on the political context in which the
decision is being made. See also Andrew D. Martin, Congressional Decision Making and
the Separation of Powers, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 361, 368-79 (2001) (using similar
analysis).
48. See Martin, Decision Making on the Supreme Court, supra note 47, at 28 (finding
no congressional influence in the Court's constitutional decisions, but finding presidential
influence consistent with the well-established impact of the Solicitor General); see also
SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 7, at 411-12 (discussing the impact of the Solicitor General
on the Supreme Court's decisions on the merits).
49. See Kevin T. McGuire, Explaining Executive Success in the U.S. Supreme Court, 51
POL. RES. Q. 505, 522 (1998).
50. James F. Spriggs, II. & Thomas G. Hansford, Explaining the Overruling of U.S.
Supreme Court Precedent, 63 J. POL. 1091, 1101, 1103 tbl.1 (2001).
51. See Joshua Clinton, An Independent Judiciary? Determining the Influence of
Congressional and Presidential Preferences on the Supreme Court's Interpretation of
Federal Statutes, 1953-1995, at 10-12 (Aug. 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
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support for the separation-of-powers model.52 Bergara, Richman, and
Spiller correct for the errors noted above in the Spiller and Gely
article,53 but when they do they find significant results in the opposite
direction in three out of their four models.54 An analysis of
congressional overrides by Hettinger and Zorn suggests it would be
counterproductive for the Court to consider congressional
preferences, because Supreme Court decisions outside of the
congressional set of irreversible decisions are no more likely to be
overridden than decisions that fall into the set." Why this might be is
subject to speculation,56 but regardless, deferring to Congress makes
little sense if such deference does not decrease the likelihood of
override. The obvious implication of this work is that sincere
behavior may almost always be the rational alternative for the Court
in statutory cases. Finally, we turn to Eskridge, one of the most
prominent separation-of-powers advocates, who wrote that:
The Court that decided Patterson and the other 1989 decisions
was producing results that did not reflect current legislative
preferences. However, this was also true of the Warren Court
(which thrived on such independence and never got overruled)
and was often true of the Burger Court (which in almost every
instance was promptly overruled). Therefore, again, ignoring
current legislative preferences is nothing new. Finally, the
Rehnquist Court approached Patterson and the other 1989
decisions from a perspective substantially more conservative
than that of Congress. But that has been true of the Court since
1972, when Justices Rehnquist and Powell started voting.
7
Et tu, Eskridge?
While the foremost proponent of the statutory separation-of-
powers model apparently finds reason to doubt the model, other
proponents accept not just the statutory model, but extend the
argument to constitutional cases as well. The constitutional model
the North Carolina Law Review).
52. See id. at 21.
53. See supra notes 36-43 and accompanying text.
54. Mario Bergara, Barak Richman & Pablo T. Spiller, Modeling Supreme Court
Strategic Decision Making: The Congressional Constraint, 28 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 247, 267
(2003).
55. Virginia A. Hettinger & Christopher Zorn, Explaining the Incidence and Timing
of Congressional Responses to the U.S. Supreme Court, 30 LEGIS. STUD. Q. (forthcoming
2005).
56. One relevant factor may be that, in even-numbered years at least, the
contemporary Congress will soon be replaced.
57. Eskridge, supra note 23, at 683.
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appears theoretically more problematic as it is more difficult for
Congress to overturn the Supreme Court's constitutional decisions
than it is for Congress to overturn the Court's statutory decisions.
The Court, knowing this, should have much more leeway to decide as
it pleases. Nevertheless, scholars have put forward a number of
factors that could constrain the Court even, or especially, in
constitutional cases?
B. Constitutional Constraints
The separation-of-powers argument as applied to the Court's
constitutional decisions relies on the same logic as the statutory
models: the wish to avoid decisions that induce responses that
damage the Court and/or its decisions. But since Congress and the
President arguably cannot directly overturn the Court's constitutional
decisions, scholars have had to look for other, less direct ways that
Congress or the President can respond. Rosenberg provides a list of
ten options, all which he argues have been attempted by either
Congress or the President or by both at some point in American
history. 9  This list includes: (1) using the Senate's judicial
confirmation power; (2) enacting constitutional amendments; (3)
impeaching; (4) withdrawing the Court's appellate jurisdiction; (5)
altering the selection and removal process; (6) requiring super-
majorities for the Court to declare legislation unconstitutional; (7)
allowing appeal from the Supreme Court to another body; (8)
removing the power of judicial review; (9) slashing the budget; and
(10) altering the size of the Court.60  Further, scholars argue that
ordinary legislation can be an effective response to the Court's
constitutional decisions,61 contending that the Court is actually more
constrained in constitutional decisions because the costs associated
with these types of responses are incredibly high.62 Epstein et al.
argue that successful attempts to override the Court's constitutional
decisions are very costly to the Court and that even unsuccessful
58. See, e.g., Epstein et al., supra note 10, at 58 (listing the ways that Congress can
constrain the Court in constitutional cases); Freidman & Harvey, Electing the Supreme
Court, supra note 13, at 126-30 (same).
59. See Gerald N. Rosenberg, Judicial Independence and the Reality of Political
Power, 54 REV. POL. 369, 376-77 (1992).
60. Id. at 377.
61. See Epstein et al., supra note 10, at 596-97; James Meernik & Joseph Ignagni,
Judicial Review and the Coordinate Construction of the Constitution, 41 AM. J. POL. SC.
447, 450-52 (1997).
62. See Epstein et al., supra note 10, at 598 (discussing damage to the Court's
authority and legitimacy).
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attempts damage the Court's legitimacy, which in turn damages the
Court's ability to influence policy effectively.63 Cross and Nelson
concur, arguing that the only thing Congress can do to the Court in
statutory cases is to reverse the Court's decision, which leaves the
Court no worse off than if it had taken Congress's preferred path
from the beginning. 64 But in the constitutional realm:
[Tlhe courts are more likely to be responsive to other sources
of influence, ranging from threats of impeachment to controls
on jurisdiction to budgetary pressures to reluctance to
implement the spirit or the letter of the courts' opinions.
Cumulatively, these influences are potentially significant and
may substantially impact judicial decisionmaking.65
A tempting response to the institutional mechanisms that
Congress does have over the Court-impeachment, appellate
jurisdiction, etcetera-is to claim that these mechanisms are so rarely
used that they could not possibly threaten the Court. But
constitutional separation-of-powers theorists would counterclaim that
that is exactly the point: the rarity of their use may be because the
Court is effectively constrained. Rogers notes that while the rarity of
congressional discipline of the Court may be because of an inability to
do so effectively, it is also possible that "we do not observe justices
being disciplined for their constitutional decisions because, as the
[separation-of-powers] equivalent of nuclear war, the cost to them is
so HIGH that they act strategically (to avoid) precisely that sort of
devastating retaliation. '"66
The final constitutional separation-of-powers argument is that
ordinary legislation is a legitimate response to the Court's legislation.
Little is said about the ultimate success of such legislation, but
Meernik and Ignagni seem to have empirical support for what they
term the "coordinate construction" of the Constitution.67 They model
a two-step process: first, they model whether a legislative response
was made to a Court's decision to strike legislation; second, they
63. See id. at 597.
64. Frank B. Cross & Blake J. Nelson, Strategic Institutional Effects on Supreme Court
Decisionmaking, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1437, 1437 (2001).
65. Id. at 1452-54.
66. Posting of Jim Rogers, ROGERS@politics.tamu.edu, to lawcourts-l@usc.edu
(Mar. 2, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). As we believe that the free
and open exchange on listservs could be damaged by academic quoting of such exchanges,
we note that this quote appears with the gracious permission of Rogers.
67. Meernik & Ignagni, supra note 61, at 448.
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model whether that attempt was successful.68 In 444 of the 569
instances that the Court struck down a federal or state law or an
executive order between 1953 and 1990, no attempt to override was
made. 69 In the second stage, forty-one of the 125 override bills
passed, which meets their definition for a successful override.7 °
Epstein and Knight note that "because Congress has in the past
overridden the Court, the justices have reason to believe that the
legislature will do so in the future, and this may be enough to cause
them to, at the very least, pay some attention to its preferences."71
These points lead Epstein and Walker to conclude that the Court's
constitutional decisions "will never be far removed from what
contemporary institutions desire.... This does not mean, however,
that the Court will never ... strike down federal laws. Indeed, if
preferences of the contemporary regime and of the Court support
those weapons, the Court will feel free to deploy them.
7 2
Thus, while we remain skeptical about the impact of Congress on
the Court's constitutional decisions, the arguments above suggest the
need for further testing.
III. CONTINUING THE SEARCH FOR THE CONSTRAINED COURT
A. Hypotheses
Despite a wide-ranging body of research, convincing evidence
that the Court is constrained by Congress in statutory cases remains
elusive. Nonetheless, theoretical arguments continue to be made that
the Court must act strategically in constitutional decisions, perhaps
even more so than in statutory decisions.73 Our purpose is to test
whether ideological distance between the median of the Court and
the House and Senate has any significant effect on the decision to
declare federal legislation unconstitutional. Increasing ideological
distance between the Court and Congress should make the Justices
less likely to declare laws unconstitutional because of the fear of a
congressional response. Such responses could be quite costly to the
68. Id. at 452.
69. Id. at 458.
70. Id.
71. LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 142 (1998).
72. Lee Epstein & Thomas G. Walker, The Role of the Supreme Court in American
Society: Playing the Reconstruction Game, in CONTEMPLATING COURTS 323-24 (Lee
Epstein ed., 1995).
73. Cross & Nelson, supra note 64, at 1437; Epstein et al., supra note 10, 597-601;
Friedman & Harvey, Electing the Supreme Court, supra note 13, at 126-30.
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Court, and the risk such responses pose should make the Court less
likely to exercise its power of judicial review. Thus, if decreasing
ideological distance between the Court and Congress increases the
frequency with which the Court declares laws unconstitutional, then
the Court may be behaving strategically in the manner explored by
Harvey and Friedman. They argue that the increase in the number of
laws declared unconstitutional after 1994 is evidence that a strategic
conservative Court finally found itself free to overturn legislation at
will after the 1994 midterm elections.74 We note, however, that this
increased activism, though with a small lag, only came after the Court
obtained a fifth vote for conservative activism with the appointment
of Thomas in 1991. 75 We examine below whether the Court's recent
activism is a response to changes in the Court's ideology vis-A-vis
Congress or is due to changes in the Court median's position.
We test this version of the constrained Court hypothesis by
examining how frequently the Court is willing to declare federal
legislation unconstitutional. More specifically, our dependent
variable is the number of laws declared unconstitutional for each term
between 1949 and 2001, as reported in The Supreme Court
Compendium.76 Figure 3 shows the number of federal laws declared
unconstitutional for each term during this time period. There appears
to be a substantial jump in the number of laws declared
unconstitutional in 1995, but note as well that the Court was fairly
consistently striking federal legislation throughout the 1960s and
1970s.
Number Federal Laws Declared Unconstitutional by Term
19 50 19 60 1970 1980 1990 26
Ter,
Figure 3
74. Harvey & Friedman, The Limits of Judicial Independence, supra note 13, at 25-
26.
75. THOMAS KECK, THE MOST, ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY 201-03
(2004).
76. LEE EPSTEIN, JEFFREY A. SEGAL, HAROLD J. SPAETH, & THOMAS G. WALKER,




The key for the constrained Court hypothesis is the relationship
between the median member of the Court and Congress. Increasing
ideological distance between the Court median and Congress should
significantly reduce the number of laws declared unconstitutional,
while decreasing ideological distance should increase the Court's
willingness to strike federal legislation. Given our skepticism about
this argument, we provide an alternative explanation for the number
of federal laws declared unconstitutional. We argue that if the Court
does not need to consider congressional preferences in constitutional
cases, then the number of laws declared unconstitutional should be a
function of changes in the ideological location of the median member
of the Court. Any such findings, needless to say, must survive
controls for other factors that might also influence that relationship.
Such decisions may thus be a function of more general "activist"
proclivities, which can be defined in many ways but for our purposes
consist of the Court's inclination to strike state legislation.
Overall, then, our analysis speaks to three related questions. Are
the Court's constitutional decisions structured by strategic
considerations of congressional and presidential preferences?
Alternatively, are these decisions simply a function of internal
changes on the Court? If so, what types of changes result in more or
fewer federal laws declared unconstitutional?
Before describing our independent variables and our theoretical
expectations concerning their effects on the willingness of the Court
to strike federal laws, we must tackle briefly a major methodological
concern in all separation-of-powers tests: the comparability of
preference measures.
B. Measuring Cross-Institutional Preferences
As we have seen in our review of the various separation-of-
powers studies, a major hurdle in testing these models is the difficulty
of creating ideological measures across different institutions that are
directly comparable. Assumptions about the relationship between
disparate scales will necessarily drive any substantive conclusion
about inter-institutional relationships. Take as an example the use of
spatial models to specify presidential strategy in the selection of
Supreme Court nominees.7 7 Bailey and Chang demonstrate quite
77. See Byron J. Moraski & Charles R. Shipan, The Politics of Supreme Court
Nominations: A Theory of Institutional Constraints and Choices, 43 AM. J. POL. SC. 1069
passim (1999). Spatial models place actors or policies in ideological space. Here, such
models specify what types of nominees to the Court would be accepted or rejected by the
Senate, given the relevant actors' ideological preferences. This involves identifying the
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simply that any conclusion about whether Presidents consider Senate
preferences when nominating Justices is possible given different
assumptions about how to compare the preference measures of the
actors involved in the decision.78 If the preferences of the different
actors cannot be aligned reliably along a common scale, then
empirical tests designed to test such spatial theories will be inherently
suspect. The substantive conclusions in any separation-of-powers
test, therefore, are only as reliable as the scales used to measure
preferences across institutions.7 9
Various solutions to this problem have been implemented, but
the most direct method is to derive preference estimates along a
common scale for individuals across institutions. Fortunately, Bailey
and Chang have developed such a method for estimating the
preferences of the Court, Senate, and President.8 ° While estimation is
computationally intensive, the intuition is straightforward.
Estimating preferences along a common scale requires "bridging"
observations-individual cases in which actors from different
institutions take positions." The idea is to take advantage of these
observations in order to form a reference for the scales on which the
preferences are to be estimated. In the context of estimating
preferences of Presidents, Senators, and Supreme Court Justices,
ideological location closest to the nominating president that will result in a confirmed
nominee.
78. See Michael Bailey & Kelly H. Chang, Comparing Presidents, Senators, and
Justices: Interinstituional Preference Estimation, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 477, 478-80 (2001).
79. See id. at 479-80 (making the important point that it is not that the scales are
necessarily incomparable, but rather, there is no way to know whether or not the scales
can be compared).
80. Bailey & Chang, supra note 78, at 483-84; see also Michael Bailey, Bridging
Institutions and Time: Common Space Preference Estimates for Presidents, Senators, and
Justices, 1946-2002, at 2-12 (Sept. 2003) (describing the methodology used in the
calculations) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
81. Bailey uses positions taken by Senators on Supreme Court cases in the
Congressional Record, in amicus briefs filed by Senators, and in Senate roll call votes
dealing with Court decisions to bridge the Court and the Senate. To bridge the President
and the Court, Bailey uses available presidential public papers for presidential statements
on Court cases and Solicitor General amicus filings. Bailey uses Spaeth's Supreme Court
Database to code whether Justices' decisions are liberal or conservative. Harold J. Spaeth,
The Original United States Supreme Court Judicial Database, 1953-2003 Terms (Lexington,
Ky.: Program from Law and Judicial Politics, University of Kentucky, 2004), available at
http://www.as.uky.edu/polisci/ ulmerproject/sctdata.htm (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review); see also KEITH POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, CONGRESS: A
POLITICAL-ECONOMiC HISTORY OF ROLL CALL VOTING (1997); Nolan McCarty &
Keith Poole, Veto Power and Legislation: An Empirical Analysis of Executive and
Legislative Bargaining from 1961 to 1986, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 282, 296-309 (1995)




Bailey and Chang use positions taken in Supreme Court cases in
which solicitors general filed amicus briefs as a way to bridge
Supreme Court Justices and Presidents. 2 This provides a set of cases
in which both Presidents and Justices take positions that in turn
allows for the estimation of preferences across institutions along a
common scale.
In our analysis, we use Bailey's updated Court-Senate-President
scores as a starting point for common measures of ideology.83 We
begin with the Bailey estimates of the Court median, the Senate
median, and the President. Because Bailey's scores have yet to
include the House, we transform Poole's common space scores for the
House into "Bailey space" with linear regression.' 4 This involves first
regressing the Bailey Senate estimates on the Poole common space
Senate estimates. The parameters from the regression equation are
then used to linearly transform Poole's House estimates on to the
Bailey scale. 5 Finally, we calculated the midpoint between the House
and the Senate to create a single ideological value for Congress. As a
side note, Bailey allows the Court ideology scores to vary over time,
while Senate and President estimates do not. Thus, the position of
the Court median can vary over time without membership change. In
Figure 4, we graph the ideology scores for the Court median,
Congress, and the President. Figure 4 demonstrates that the Court
has been more conservative than Congress since 1970. It is also
important to note that there is less distance between the Court and
Congress in the mid-1990s, but the Court remains more conservative
than Congress during that time period.
82. Bailey and Chang, supra note 78, at 487.
83. We use the latest version of the scores, which we will refer to as "Bailey scores."
For the newest set of measures, see Bailey, supra note 80, at 18-24. We thank Bailey for
his generosity in making a preliminary version of his scores available to the authors. We
wish to stress that Bailey's preference estimates used in this paper are provisional in
nature, as the scores are currently in the process of being updated to include measures for
the House.
84. Keith T. Poole, Recovering a Basic Space from a Set of Issue Scales, 42 AM. J. POL.
ScI. 954, 978-88 (1998). Scores updated through the 107th Congress are readily available
on Poole's website. See The Voteview Website, www.voteview.com (last visited Feb. 9,
2005) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). Also, like the Bailey scores, larger
values in Poole's common space correspond to increasing conservatism.
85. This has become an increasingly popular solution for generating comparable
estimates. See Hettinger & Zorn, supra note 55; Clinton, supra note 51, at 12; Harvey &
Friedman, The Limits of Judicial Independence, supra note 13, at 17-18.
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From these ideology scores, we are able to calculate our first two
independent variables: the ideological distance of the Court median
to Congress and the ideological distance of the Court median to the
President. Obviously, these are central to the constrained Court
hypothesis, and the theoretical expectations should at this point be
quite clear. Recalling the insights of the Median Voter Theorem, the
median member of the Court will be able to exert great control in all
cases in which there is a simple majority rule decision to be made, as
is the case when the decision is made on the merits.86 A median
member that strategically considers the preferences of the ruling
regime, however, would not strike down a law given the threat of a
costly reprisal. Therefore, our first independent variable is the
ideological distance between the median member of the Court and
Congress. If the Court strikes down fewer laws as ideological
distance between the two branches increases, then we have evidence
that the Court considers congressional preferences in its
constitutional decisions. We also calculate the distance between the
Court median and the President. While most of the separation-of-
powers models focus on the Court-Congress relationship, the
constrained Court hypothesis extends to Court-President relations as
well. The President, like Congress, has an array of possible negative
responses to unpalatable Court decisions, even in constitutional
cases, 87 and the Court may seek to avoid such responses from
86. See generally BLACK, supra note 1, at 16-18 (discussing majority voting generally);
DOWNS, supra note 1, at 115-22 (demonstrating the median voter result in democratic
elections).
87. See Epstein et al., supra note 10, at 598 (discussing the President's ability to
detract from the Court's legitimacy); Rosenberg, supra note 59, at 377 (discussing the
congressional and presidential tactics noted supra in Section IIB).
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Congress and the President alike, insofar as those responses incur
costs to the Court. These two variables provide a direct test of the
constrained Court hypothesis.
Our next set of independent variables aims to test the
unconstrained Court hypothesis. The unconstrained Court
hypothesis suggests that changes in the location of the ideological
position of the median member of the Court should determine how
many laws per term the Court declares unconstitutional. As the
ideological position of the median of the Court changes, so too will
the cut point that determines whether a majority will strike a law as
unconstitutional. For example, a federal law survives constitutional
review if it is just to the right of the median member's cut point, yet
that same law could be struck if the median of the Court is located
just to the left of the median's cut point. Laws that were acceptable
to the previous majority on the Court may no longer be supported by
the new majority that is created as the median changes. Also, since
the Court has almost complete discretion over the cases it decides,
changes in the location of the Court median should have an
immediate effect. Therefore, a change in the position of the median
could result in an immediate increase in the number of laws declared
unconstitutional, since the new Court will likely have little difficulty
in selecting cases as vehicles to overturn legislation. From the
unconstrained Court perspective, the number of laws per term that
the Court declares unconstitutional is primarily a function of the
change in the ideological composition of the Court. To test this
hypothesis, we include as an independent variable the absolute value
of the change from term to term in the location of the median of the
Court.
There are good reasons to believe, though, that the direction of
the change in the location of the median may be more important than
just change itself. A central but much disputed tenet of the
attitudinal model is that the liberal-conservative dimension of judicial
ideology matches up with a conventional understanding of those
terms.8 The attitudinal model argues that judicial ideology is not
arrayed along dimensions unique to judges.8 9 Conservatism, which
can be associated with a desire for less federal regulation, could mean
that increasing conservatism on the Court should lead to more federal
88. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 76, at 230 tbls. 3-7 (discussing liberal judicial
decisions as pro-civil rights, pro-individual against the government in First Amendment
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laws being declared unconstitutional. Conversely, there is a long
standing assumption that liberal judges are more willing to strike
down legislation.' While there have been important attempts to
make careful distinctions between different types of activism,91 a
conventional understanding of the concept still includes the
willingness of a judge to strike down laws as unconstitutional.
Activism on the Court has seemed to refer to a liberal Court's
readiness to use the power of judicial review to strike down
legislation.' The label "liberal activist judge" may be more than
conservative invective, and there may in fact be an empirical basis for
the continuing association of liberalism with this type of activism.93
Because direction of change may matter, we estimate an
alternative model with the raw value, rather than the absolute value,
of change in the ideological position of the median member of the
Court. For the Bailey measures, larger scores reflect increasing
conservatism, so positive values of the change in the Court median
reflect increasing conservatism on the Court, while negative values of
change mean the Court becomes more liberal. Therefore, a positive,
significant coefficient on the raw value of Court change would suggest
that increasing conservatism results in more laws declared
unconstitutional and increasing liberalism results in fewer laws
declared unconstitutional. A negative coefficient on the raw value of
change means that more laws will be struck as the Court becomes
more liberal. The specification of a model with the raw value of
change allows us to test whether or not the direction of ideological
change matters by providing a comparison with the absolute change
specification and also allows us to evaluate long-standing claims
about the nature of ideology and activism on the Court.
We include one additional independent variable that is also
potentially related to activism on the Court. It could be that there is a
level of willingness to strike down legislation that is unrelated to both
the Court's relationship to Congress and the President and to changes
in the location of the median member of the Court. Some courts
may, all else being equal, simply have a greater proclivity to strike
90. KECK, supra note 75, at 183-86.
91. See Bradley C. Canon, Defining the Dimensions of Judicial Activism, 66
JUDICATURE 236,238-39 (1983).
92. Id. at 237-38.
93. See generally RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977) (decrying
the extensive liberal activism of the Warren Court); Robert H. Bork, Activist Judges Strike
Again, WALL ST, J., Dec. 22, 1999, at A18 (decrying liberal judicial activism).
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legislation. 4  To measure this possible latent activism, we use the
number of state laws declared unconstitutional per term.95
D. Estimation and Results
Because our dependent variable is an event count (i.e., the
number of times an event happens per specified time period) and
therefore is not normally distributed, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
regression is generally inappropriate. 96 We therefore estimate a series
of different event count models along with OLS regression.97 If the
94. See, e.g., Gregory A. Caldeira & Donald J. McCrone, Of Time and Judicial
Activism: A Study of the U.S. Supreme Court, 1800-1973, in STEPHEN C. HALPERN &
CHARLES M. LAMB, SUPREME COURT ACTIVISM AND RESTRAINT 103 (1982) (examining
the extent of judicial activism over time).
95. As with counting the number of federal laws declared unconstitutional, we rely on
EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 76, at 167-93 & tbl. 2-6.
96. OLS, the most basic regression technique, minimizes the sum of squared errors
when fitting regression models, but is inappropriate under many different conditions,
including event counts, where the error term rarely meets the assumption of a normal
distribution. See GARY KING, UNIFYING POLITICAL METHODOLOGY 122 (1989)
(explaining the potential problems with using OLS with count data); Gary King, Statistical
Models for Political Science Event Counts: Bias in Conventional Procedures and Evidence
for the Exponential Poisson Regression Model, 32 AM. J. POL. SCI. 838, 845-46 (1988)
[hereinafter King, Statistical Models]. Poisson regression is appropriate for count data
because a dependent variable that can be assumed to follow a poisson distribution will
have nonnegative, whole values. King, Statistical Models, supra, at 841-42.
97. There are also issues raised by the potential dynamics that may be inherent in our
time-series data. We will not focus on dynamic specifications for several reasons. First, all
of the tests we conducted (Dickey-Fuller, Augmented Dickey-Fuller, and KPSS) to
determine whether the dependent variable is generated by a long-memory process lead us
to conclude that the series is stationary and not generated by a long-memory process. An
examination of the ACF graphs suggest there may be some slight autocorrelation in our
data, however. To test whether a dynamic specification would change any of the
inferences we present, we estimated an AR (1) model with a lagged dependent variable.
This estimation assumes the dependent variable is normally distributed, but the similarity
between the non-dynamic OLS and event count models we estimate suggest that this is an
acceptable specification for illustrative purposes. The lagged dependent variable is
positive and significant in the AR (1) model, but more importantly, all of the rest of the
substantive results from the non-dynamic specifications hold in this model. The
significance of the lagged dependent variable suggests there is a positive linear trend over
time. The lagged dependent variable is not as direct of a test of either the constrained or
unconstrained Court hypothesis, but the finding that overturning laws in the previous term
leads to slightly more laws being overturned in the next term is hard to reconcile with the
constrained Court hypothesis. Further, we estimated the same model with the Prais-
Winston estimator, which is a generalized least squares, rather than maximum likelihood,
estimator to estimate a model with a first order autoregressive error term. This yields
identical estimates to the maximum likelihood model. For interested parties, all of these
results are available upon request. We should note that two recent estimation techniques
for event count time series data have been introduced in the political science literature.
See Patrick T. Brandt & John T. Williams, A Linear Poisson Autoregressive Model. The
Poisson AR (p) Model, 9 POL. ANALYSIS 164, 164-66 (2001); Patrick T. Brandt, John T.
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mean and variance of the process being modeled are equal, then a
poisson regression model is appropriate. In practice, unobserved
heterogeneity or possible contagion effects will cause the conditional
variance to be larger than the conditional mean, in which case poisson
estimates remain consistent but the standard errors will be too small.98
This increases the danger of making incorrect inferences since, under
these circumstances, poisson regression is (inappropriately) more
likely to find significant effects among the independent variables.
The negative binomial regression model relaxes the restriction that
the mean and variance are equal and provides a solution by
introducing an estimated dispersion parameter.99 We present the
OLS, poisson, and negative binomial results in Table 1.
Table 1
EXPLAINING THE NUMBER OF FEDERAL LAWS DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Independent OLS Poisson Neg. Binomial
Variable
Court/Congress -0.41 -0.22 -0.27 -0.23 -0.28 -0.24
Distance (0.72) (0.71) (0-44) (0.39) (0.44) (0.39)
CourtlExecutive -0.55 -0.46 -0.35 -0.24 -0.37 -0.25
Distance (0.51) (0.48) (0.27) (0.34) (0.35) (0.34)
# of State Laws 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Unconstitutional (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Change in Court -1.40 ----- 1.17 ----- 1.20 -----
Median (absolute) (1.03) (1.10) (1.09)
Change in Court ----- 2.16*** ----- 1.78*** ---- 1.80**
Median (raw) (0.75) (0.59) (0.62)
Constant 2.13*** 1.92*** 0.83** 0.63* 0.84** 0.63*
(0.62) (0.58) (0.36) (0.33) (0.36) (0.34)
alpha (Dispersion 0.07 0.03
Parameter (0.11) (0.10)
Log Likelihood -84.811 -82.917 -84.667 -82.895
Wald x2  3 .12  1 3 .2 0 * *  3 .1 8  1 2 .16 **
N = 52. Robust Standard Errors in ()
*p_< .10; ** p: .05; *** p : .01
Williams, Benjamin 0. Fordham, & Brian Pollins, Dynamic Modeling for Persistent Event-
Count Time Series, 44 AM. J. POL. SC. 823, 824 (2000). The model suggested in Brandt et
al. (2000) is only appropriate for long-memory data processes. The model suggested in
Brandt and Williams (2001) is potentially more useful, but not necessarily so. With data
with considerably more autocorrelation than is present in our data, Brandt and Williams
fail to find any meaningful distinctions between a standard poisson model and their PAR
(p) model. This leads Brandt and Williams to the conclusion that, "event count time series
models such as the PAR (p) may not change the substantive interpretations of Poisson or
other event count regressions." Brandt & Williams, supra, at 180.
98. J. SCOTT LONG, REGRESSION MODELS FOR CATEGORICAL AND LIMITED
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 221-30 (1997).
99. Otherwise, the negative binomial model is the same as the poisson model.
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The first thing to note in Table 1 is the consistency of the results;
the conclusions that follow clearly do not depend on the different
modeling choices. The first substantive point from these results is the
complete lack of support for the hypothesis that ideological distance
between the Court and Congress and the President constrains the
Court's constitutional decisions. In all specifications, the ideological
distance between the Court and either Congress or the President has
no significant effect on the numbers of laws declared unconstitutional,
and neither distance measure remotely approaches conventional
levels of statistical significance. Despite the prestigious list of
scholars who have argued that Congress and/or the President
constrain the Court's constitutional decisions, and noting that there
may be other ways to test this relationship, we find no support for
that argument in this analysis. The fear of a potentially costly reprisal
from an ideologically divergent Congress or President is not enough
to prevent the Court from striking down legislation.
As noted, Harvey and Friedman contend that the increase in the
number of laws declared unconstitutional after 1994 is evidence that a
strategic conservative Court found itself finally free to overturn
legislation at will after the 1994 midterm elections.1" At first glance,
this may seem to be an enticing conclusion, yet the intuitive appeal is
not matched with empirical support. This is less surprising given a
more careful consideration of the assumption behind the Harvey and
Friedman hypothesis that the distance between Congress and the
Court median suddenly and drastically reduced after 1994. As Figure
4 shows, the Court and Congress moved closer together in ideological
space in 1995, but the distance between the Court and Congress was
still larger in 1995 than the mean difference over the time period for
our data. 101 Once this is considered, even the single point in time that
seems to support the constrained Court hypothesis no longer fits
easily into an explanation of strategic constitutional
decisionmaking.0 2  Again, the unavoidable conclusion from our
100. See Friedman & Harvey, Electing the Supreme Court, supra note 13, at 138;
Harvey & Friedman, The Limits of Judicial Independence, supra note 13, at 25-26.
101. The mean distance between Congress and the Court from 1949 to 2002 was 0.32.
In 1995, the distance between the Court and Congress was 0.37 (down from 0.50 in 1994).
It is also worth noting that by 2001, the distance between the Court and Congress was
back to pre-1995 levels (0.46 in 2001). This change has not included a corresponding
reduction in the number of laws per term declared unconstitutional.
102. As another test of the constrained Court hypothesis, we substituted ideological
distance between the Court and Congress with the change in distance. Negative values
mean the Court and Congress moved closer together, positive values that the institutions
moved apart. Needless to say, the results in no way differ from the estimates that we
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analysis is that there is simply no relationship between the ideological
distance between the Court, Congress, and the President and the
number of laws that the Court decides to overturn.
Our results do more than just fail to provide evidence for the
constrained Court hypothesis. While the number of state laws
declared unconstitutional has nothing to do with the number of
federal laws struck, °3 change in the location of the median member of
the Court does significantly increase the number of laws declared
unconstitutional. When the absolute value of the change in the
position of the median member of the Court is included in any of the
models, there is no significant effect. The raw value of Court change,
however, is significant. The positive sign on the coefficient means
that as the Court becomes more conservative, it is more likely to
strike down more federal laws as unconstitutional. Because of the
insignificant dispersion parameter in the negative binomial
regression, we interpret the poisson regression estimates. We use
CLARIFY to estimate the predicted number of laws declared
unconstitutional for particular values of Court change with the other
independent variables held at their means.1 Figure 5 graphs the
predicted probability of the number of laws declared unconstitutional
for the most liberal change observed in our data, the median value of
change (which is a slight change in the conservative direction), and
for the most conservative change observed in our data. For the
largest change in the liberal direction in the location of the Court
median, the predicted probability of having zero laws overturned is
0.72, while the probability of zero laws being overturned when the
Court moves slightly in the conservative direction is only 0.19. For
the most conservative value of change that we observe, the predicted
probability that the Court overturns three or more laws is 0.66.05 To
present.
103. We also explored the possibility that the number of state and federal laws
declared unconstitutional were cointegrated. As previously mentioned, the number of
federal laws declared unconstitutional is not a long memory series, which precludes the
possibility of it being cointegrated with another series. Further, a simple regression of one
series on the other and an examination of these residuals also indicate that there is no
relationship between these two series.
104. CLARIFY is a software tool that uses a statistical simulation to provide readily
interpretable quantities of interest for statistical models. See Software by Gary King, at
http://gking.harvard.edu/stats.shtml (last visited Feb. 14, 2005) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review). For an extended discussion, see generally Gary King, Michael
Tomz, & Jason Wittenberg, Making the Most of Statistical Analyses: Improving
Interpretation and Presentation, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 347 (2000).
105. This is calculated simply by adding the probability of observing 0, 1, or 2 laws
overturned and subtracting from 1. In terms of Figure 5, this predicted probability
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compare changes of equal magnitude in different directions, we graph
in Figure 6 the predicted probabilities for a change of 0.10
(conservative change) and of -0.10 (liberal change). Figure 6 shows
that there is a greater chance of observing zero or one law overturned
as the Court median moves 0.10 in the liberal direction compared to
an equal change in the conservative direction, while a change of 0.10
in the conservative direction makes observing two or more laws
overturned more likely than the corresponding liberal change.
Predicted Number of Laws Declared Unconstitutional
ocq
-I .. . , .. ....... .... ....... ...... ...... .... .. .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
------ ----- -----
o 1 2 3 4 5
Number of Laws Declared Unconstitutional
-- Most Conservative Change -- - Median Value of Change
------- Most Uberal Change
Figure 5
Equidistant Liberal and Conservative Changes
0 t 1 4
Number of Laws Declared Unconstitutional
Uberal Change of -0.10 --- Conservative Change of 0.10
Figure 6
CONCLUSION
The median Justice on the Court may or may not be crucial to
the granting of certiorari and does not appear to be crucial to the
writing of the majority opinion.1 16 But given majoritarian voting rules
corresponds to the total area under the curve of the maximum conservative change from
three laws to infinity.
106. See Westerland, supra note 15, at 30 (arguing that the median member of the
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and the apparently unidimensional nature of Supreme Court
decisionmaking, the median is crucial to the decision on the merits,
including the decision as to whether to strike federal legislation.
While the substantial weight of evidence rejects the notion that the
Court median defers to Congress in statutory cases, many prominent
scholars argue that the Court has separate reasons to defer to
congressional preferences in constitutional cases.1"7
While there may be many ways to test these findings, our tests,
based on the number of federal statutes declared unconstitutional per
year, reject the notion that distance between the Court and Congress
and the executive is a factor in such decisions. Rather, this form of
judicial activism appears to be the result of an increasingly
conservative Court. Thus, these findings do reject the notion, for
those who still need clarity on this issue, that judicial activism is a
liberal phenomenon.
We do not believe, though, that the finding that the Court strikes
down more laws as it becomes more conservative is inherent in the
nature of Supreme Court-congressional relations. During the past
fifty years, the federal government has taken the lead, among other
things, in protecting civil rights18 and providing social welfare
benefits, 0 9 at least compared to the states. Were the federal
government to move consistently in the opposite direction, liberal
Courts might be more inclined to strike federal laws. Regardless,
these decisions are now and will continue to be the result of the
preferences of the Court's median Justice.
majority, not the median member of the Court, most influences the writing of the majority
opinion).
107. See, e.g., EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 71, at 57 (describing the interplay
between outside forces and the Supreme Court); Epstein et al., supra note 10, at 600-01
(same); Harvey & Friedman, The Limits of Judicial Independence, supra note 13, at 3-8
(same).
108. See, e.g., the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-2000 (2000) (providing
that all persons, regardless of race, shall have equal rights under the law).
109. Examples include the Medicare and Medicaid programs, which are both part of
the Social Security Act amendments of 1965. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395x (2000).
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